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WHAT JURORS WANT TO KNOW: MOTIVATING
JUROR COGNITION TO INCREASE LEGAL
KNOWLEDGE & IMPROVE DECISIONMAKING
SARA GORDON
What do jurors want to know? Jury research tells us that jurors
want to understand the information they hear in a trial so they can
reach the correct decision. But like all people, jurors who are asked to
analyze information in a trial—even jurors who consciously want to
reach a fair and accurate verdict—are unconsciously influenced by
their internal goals and motivations. Some of these motives are
specific to individual jurors; for instance, a potential juror with a
financial interest in a case would be excluded from the jury pool. But
other motivations, like the motive to understand the law and to reach
an accurate verdict, are core social motives that influence the
cognition of all jurors. Although those motives may be less obvious
than those of the juror with a financial stake in the case, they still
have a profound influence on how jurors learn the law and interpret
evidence, and we can use them to better motivate jurors to efficiently
learn the law and to think carefully about how the law will apply to
the facts they will see in a trial.
A significant body of legal literature has examined jurors’ use and
understanding of the substantive law they receive in jury
instructions, and many scholars have recommended methods to
improve juror comprehension of instructions. This Article is the first
law journal article to take that analysis a step further and consider
all of the major scientific studies that examine motivated cognition
and apply them to jury decisionmaking. Because much of juror
cognition is motivated, we can harness the power of this motivated
cognition to further increase juror comprehension of the law and
improve juror decisionmaking.
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INTRODUCTION
“It’s not that I’m so smart, it’s just that I stay with problems
longer.”
-Albert Einstein
In a study at the University of Minnesota, female college
students participated in what they were told was a “dating study.”1
All of the women received certain information about the dating
preferences of an attractive man named Tom Ferguson.2 They were
told that Tom had examined the personality files of 50 other women,
and based on those women’s personal characteristics, had decided
which of them he wanted to date.3 The women were then asked to
decide, based on Tom’s decisions, which characteristics were most

1. Allan R. Harkness et al., Personal Involvement and Strategies for Making
Contingency Judgments: A Stake in the Dating Game Makes a Difference, 49 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 22, 24 (1985).
2. Id. at 27.
3. The complete list of possible attributes included having a sense of humor,
being outgoing, being jealous, being athletic, being liberal, having high intelligence,
and being attractive. Id.
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important to Tom in a partner.4 Some of the women believed they
would have a date with Tom after they completed the study, and
some did not.5 The women who were motivated to be accurate—those
to whom the information was important because they expected to
date Tom—paid closer attention to the information in the
personality files, thought more carefully about their decisions, and
used more complex and more efficient assessment strategies when
deciding what Tom was looking for in a partner.6 In other words,
because they wanted to know more about Tom, they worked harder
to make good decisions.7
Like the women in the dating study, jurors who are asked to
analyze information in a trial—even jurors who consciously want to
reach a fair and accurate verdict—are unconsciously influenced by
their own internal goals and motivations.8 Some of these motives are
specific to individual jurors; for instance, a potential juror with a
financial interest in a case would be excluded from the jury pool. But
other motivations, like the motive to understand the law and to
reach an accurate verdict, are core social motives that influence the
cognition of all jurors.9 Although those motives may be less obvious
than those of the juror with a financial stake in the case, they still
have a profound influence on how jurors learn the law and interpret
evidence.
While jurors have traditionally been seen as “blank slates” who
could be instructed to base decisions solely on the permissible
evidence and the appropriate legal standard, the social science
research on both jurors10 and other human decisionmakers11 does
not support this view. Instead, as with all people, motivated
cognition affects the way jurors acquire knowledge and make
decisions about information. Because motivations are pervasive and

4. Id.
5. Id. at 27, 31.
6. Id. at 31.
7. Id. Both groups of subjects used statistically comparable amounts of time in
assessing the information, but those in the “dating” group employed more complex
strategies during that time. Id.
8. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated
Cognition, And Some Problems For Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19
(2010).
9. See generally ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE
246 (1999) (discussing how personal goals and motivations influence judgments).
10. See, e.g., Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror
Decision Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 519 (1991).
11. See, e.g., Paul T. P. Wong & Bernard Weiner, When People Ask “Why”
Questions, and the Heuristics of Attributional Search, 40 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 650, 661–62 (1981).

754

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:751

largely unconscious, we cannot eliminate their influence on jury
decisionmaking. Moreover, it would be impossible to even catalogue
the huge variety of ideological beliefs and worldviews that influence
and motivate jury verdicts, nor can we expect to fully mitigate jurors’
preconceptions on their understanding of the law and evaluation of
evidence. All of these things motivate jurors’ decisions, and like most
biased reasoning, they cannot be severed from jurors’ interpretation
and processing of evidence.12 What we can do, however, is harness
the power of motivated cognition to motivate jurors to learn the law
and use it to make better decisions about the evidence. Specifically, I
propose that we use insights from studies of motivation and goalsetting to motivate jurors to understand the law, to be accurate in
that understanding, and to persist in thinking about the law until
they reach a good decision.
Part I of this Article discusses the use of jury instructions as the
primary vehicle for juror education about the law, as well as the
persistent lack of juror comprehension of those instructions, even
when the instructions are rewritten according to psycholinguistic
principles. This Part also discusses the importance of the
representative jury in the American legal system and why that
system is not undermined by more extensive juror education about
relevant legal concepts. This Article does not suggest that we should
abandon our representative system, but instead recommends that
courts use principles of motivation and goal setting to help lay juries
develop greater knowledge of the applicable law. Because motivations
have such a profound impact on knowledge acquisition and
information processing, Part II of this Article will examine the
different types of core social motivations that are most relevant to
juror comprehension and decisionmaking, specifically the motives to
understand and be accurate, and the motive for closure. Part III
reviews the social science literature on knowledge and performance
goals and deliberative and implemental mindsets to explain how
jurors can be motivated to understand the law needed to interpret
facts in a trial and to persist in thinking about the law until they
reach a decision. Part IV recommends methods to motivate jurors to
learn and understand the law before reaching a verdict. Educational
psychology principles inform this discussion and help illuminate how
to improve juror comprehension of substantive and procedural laws,
thereby improving decisionmaking.

12. See, e.g., Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, They Saw a Game: A Case
Study, 49 J. ABNORM. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 129, 129 (1954) (finding that subjects’ mental
states shaped how they interpreted evidence).
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I. LOW JUROR COMPREHENSION OF THE LAW AND WHY MORE
EXTENSIVE JUROR EDUCATION IS NOT AT ODDS WITH A
REPRESENTATIVE JURY SYSTEM
The right to a jury trial is a fundamental part of the American
democratic ethos, and much of the trust we place in jurors is based
on our belief that they will infuse the decisionmaking process with a
common sense approach and community values.13 In addition to
basing their decisions on common sense, however, we expect that
jurors’ decisions will be legally warranted and internally
consistent.14 We implicitly assume that by the end of a trial, jurors
understand the law they will be expected to apply to the evidence, or
at least that their understanding will be good enough to reach the
“right” verdict.15 The social science research on jury comprehension
of jury instructions tells us otherwise, however, with comprehension
rates sometimes no better than chance.16 Furthermore, the research
consistently shows that if jurors do not understand the law—and as
laypeople, they typically have little or incorrect knowledge of the law
when they enter the courtroom—they will rely on preexisting
stereotypes, biases, and incorrect expectations of what the law is.17
In other words, jurors often know just enough about the law to be
dangerous but not enough to reach a decision on the facts that is
well-supported by the relevant law.18
Because juries are typically composed of lay people with no
special legal training or background, jurors must first be educated
about the applicable substantive law and procedural rules before
they can reach a decision. This education is typically accomplished
by giving the jury written instructions, which are culled from the
applicable statutes and case law and drafted by attorneys or

13. VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 31 (1986); see also
DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS 184
(2012) (stating that common sense is “[a] primary justification cited for entrusting
jurors with the task of deciding criminal verdicts”).
14. See SIMON, supra note 13, at 184–85.
15. See id. at 185.
16. See generally id. (citing various studies).
17. See Shari Seidman Diamond, Instructing on Death: Psychologists, Juries,
and Judges, 48 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 423, 429–30 (1993); see also Sara Gordon,
Through The Eyes Of Jurors: The Use of Schemas in the Application of “PlainLanguage” Jury Instructions, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 643 (2013) (discussing the impact of
schemas on juror comprehension and use of jury instructions).
18. See generally Gordon, supra note 17 (discussing the impact of schemas on
juror comprehension and use of jury instructions).
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advisory committees.19 Instructions tell jurors about the applicable
law and give them a mechanism to interpret the facts they have seen
in a trial; they are meant to provide the entirety of substantive legal
knowledge jurors need to make a decision in a case.20 Jurors are
given instructions throughout the trial, but the most extensive
instructions on substantive law are generally given at the end of a
trial.21 Instructions, therefore, are the crucial link between how
jurors perceive and understand the facts they are told and how they
use those facts and the law to reach a verdict; jurors, however, do not
typically receive this legal education until after they have seen the
evidence.22 When jurors do finally receive instructions, the
instructions are often full of language taken from statutes and cases.
While the instructions are meant to teach jurors the relevant law,
they are not typically drafted with the jurors’ education in mind, nor
do they generally offer much guidance to jurors for applying that law
to the facts in order to reach a decision.
Because the rules of evidence limit inquiry into the jury’s
decisionmaking process, it can be difficult to determine the extent to
which jurors understand the law they receive in jury instructions.23
However, research in social science has consistently shown that

19. See generally Peter Tiersma, The Rocky Road to Legal Reform: Improving
the Language of Jury Instructions, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1081, 1083, 1085 (2001)
(discussing the history and evolution of jury instructions).
20. Different types of instructions address the different things the jury is asked
to consider. Some instructions tell jurors how to evaluate evidence and weigh the
credibility of witnesses, some explain the burden of proof, and others provide
definitions and elements of crimes or claims. NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS,
AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 161 (2007).
21. There are very few laws regulating the use and timing of jury instructions,
and the judge’s authority to manage a trial effectively allows for instructions at any
point. Neil Cohen, The Timing of Jury Instructions, 67 TENN. L. REV. 681, 684 (1999–
2000).
22. See generally HON. GREGORY E. MIZE (RET.) ET AL., THE STATE-OF-THESTATES SURVEY OF JURY IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS: A COMPENDIUM REPORT 36 (2007)
[hereinafter State of the States Survey], available at http://www.ncsc-jurystudies.org/
~/media/Microsites/Files/CJS/SOS/SOSCompendiumFinal.ashx. While some states
do require some type of pre-instruction, most leave the decision to the judge’s
discretion, though the survey results suggested that “many judges who preinstructed their juries view this technique as part of a set of jury trial practices;
those who did so were also significantly more likely to permit jurors to take notes, to
submit questions to witnesses, to permit juror discussions before deliberations, to
deliver final instructions before closing arguments, and to provide jurors with a
written copy of the instructions.” Id. at 37.
23. FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
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jurors have considerable difficulty understanding instructions,24 and
several studies have found that jurors typically understand a little
more than half of the instructions they receive.25 Much of this
research has focused on improving juror comprehension by rewriting
the instructions using psycholinguistic principles to improve
vocabulary, syntax, and organization, making them simpler and
more comprehensible to jurors.26 Pattern and standard instructions,
particularly those rewritten according to psycholinguistic principles,
have improved juror comprehension, often by 20 to 30%.27 Because
jury instructions can form a basis for legal arguments on appeal,
however, many of these pattern instructions have emphasized
technical accuracy, sometimes overlooking the primary purpose of
the instructions: to teach jurors the law28 And as one author notes,
“no matter how technically accurate an instruction is, it fails in its

24. See, e.g., Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Alan Reifman, Juror Comprehension and
Public Policy: Perceived Problems and Proposed Solutions, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y &
L. 788 (2000); Amiram Elwork et al., Juridic Decisions: In Ignorance of the Law or in
Light of It?, 1 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 163 (1977); David U. Strawn & Raymond W.
Buchanan, Jury Confusion: A Threat to Justice, 59 JUDICATURE 478 (1976). In one
empirical study of juror confusion, researchers found that jurors understood less
than half the content of the tested instructions. Walter W. Steele, Jr. & Elizabeth G.
Thornburg, Jury Instructions: A Persistent Failure to Communicate, 67 N.C. L. REV.
77, 78 (1988). In another, despite instructions to the contrary, 43% of potential jurors
believed that circumstantial evidence was of no value, and 23% believed that when
faced with equal evidence of a defendant’s guilt or innocence, the defendant should
be convicted. Id. at 84–85.
25. See, e.g., Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language
Understandable: A Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REV.
1306, 1316 (1979) (54%); Phoebe Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better Than One?, 52
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205, 219 (1989) (“[O]nly half of the references to the law
were accurate, even when credit was given for partial accuracy. One-fifth of the
references were clearly, seriously wrong.”); Amiram Elwork et al., Toward
Understandable Jury Instructions, 65 JUDICATURE 432, 436 (1981–82) (51%).
26. The study of psycholinguistics provides insights about the linguistic reasons
underlying problems of language processing and comprehension. See Charrow &
Charrow, supra note 25, at 1308; see also Robert D. Charrow, Joel D. Lieberman &
Bruce D. Sales, What Social Science Teaches Us About the Jury Instruction Process, 3
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 589, 623–27 (1997); Elwork et al., supra note 24, at 165–
69.
27. See Joel D. Lieberman, The Psychology of the Jury Instruction Process, in
JURY PSYCHOLOGY: SOCIAL ASPECTS OF TRIAL PROCESSES 142 (2009).
28. Geoffrey P. Kramer & Dorean M. Koenig, Do Jurors Understand Criminal
Jury Instructions? Analyzing The Results Of The Michigan Juror Comprehension
Project, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 401, 404 (1990).

758

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:751

primary purpose if jurors are unable to use it to deliberate and
determine verdicts.”29
Furthermore, these reforms do not address the fact that even if
jurors understand the language and syntax used in instructions, this
does not mean that they necessarily understand the underlying
substantive law, and such an understanding is crucial to a juror’s
ability to analyze the facts in a trial. Jury research shows that jurors
have difficulty understanding instructions about both procedural
and substantive legal concepts, and the problem extends to civil and
criminal trials.30 For example, one study found that even where
reasonable doubt is defined in jury instructions, 69% of people who
had previously served as jurors incorrectly believed that they had to
be 100% sure of the defendant’s guilt before they found him guilty.31
Substantive instructions pose a similar problem.32 In the same
study, two-thirds of instructed jurors incorrectly thought that
physical injury was necessary to convict for assault.33 Jurors also
have difficulty understanding a variety of concepts related to civil
litigation including negligence, liability, and damages.34 Finally, and

29. Id. at 404.
30. See generally id. (discussing the impact jury instructions have on jurors’
understanding, and the confusion that may result from the instructions).
31. Id. at 414. Reasonable doubt was defined as follows:
A reasonable doubt is a fair, honest doubt growing out of the evidence or
lack of evidence in this case or growing out of any reasonable or legitimate
inferences drawn from the evidence or the lack of evidence. It is not merely
an imaginary doubt or a flimsy, fanciful doubt or a doubt based upon the
mere possibility of the innocence of the defendant or a doubt based upon
sympathy, but rather it is a fair, honest doubt based upon reason and
common sense. It is a state of mind which would cause you to hesitate in
making an important decision in your own personal life. By stating that the
prosecution must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, I mean there must
be such evidence that causes you to have a firm conviction to a moral
certainty of the truth of the charge here made against the defendant.
Id. at 436.
32. See, e.g., id. at 423 (finding that jury instructions for assault did not
improve comprehension).
33. Id. at 423.
34. See, e.g., Edith Greene & Michael Johns, Jurors’ Use of Instructions on
Negligence, 31 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 840, 840 (2001) (finding 64% overall
comprehension of civil negligence instructions); Reid Hastie et al., A Study of Juror
and Jury Judgments in Civil Cases: Deciding Liability for Punitive Damages, 22 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 287, 295 (1998) (finding that the average score on a comprehension
test of jury instructions on liability was 9%).
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most distressingly, capital instructions in death penalty trials are
especially hard for jurors to understand.35 When study participants
were read standard California death penalty instructions and asked
to define the concepts of aggravation and mitigation, 21% of
participants either incorrectly defined or did not define aggravation,
and 47% incorrectly defined or did not define mitigation.36
Given the significant role jurors play as decisionmakers in our
legal system, this lack of comprehension is troubling.
Notwithstanding the persistently low comprehension rates, however,
some scholars make the point that jurors do in fact understand most
of the evidence and applicable law they see in trials, and that judges
agree with jury verdicts in most cases.37 One study found a 78%
agreement rate between judges and juries, which the author noted is
almost as good as the 79% or 80% agreement rate among judges
making sentencing decisions on custody cases38 But while this
observation is, of course, important when comparing the
decisionmaking of judges and juries, as Professor Dan Simon notes,
“it hardly speaks to the actual diagnosticity of either one.”39
Moreover, law is a domain in which knowledge about the domain
confers competence, and jurors would benefit from additional
training before being asked to reach a decision.40 In other domains,
competence is not wholly dependent on underlying knowledge.41 For
instance, a person could competently dunk a basketball without
knowing the rules or the history of basketball, but the same is not
true of the law. Jurors without legal knowledge or with incorrect
legal knowledge could certainly make a decision, but that decision is
not likely to be “correct” in that it is supported by the relevant law. 42
Furthermore, recent research on metacognition and self-assessment

35. Lieberman, supra note 27, at 136 (citing various studies).
36. Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Comprehending Life and Death Matters: A
Preliminary Study of California's Capital Penalty Instructions, 18 L. & HUM. BEHAV.
411, 419, 421 (1994).
37. See, e.g., RANDALL KISER, BEYOND RIGHT AND WRONG: THE POWER OF
EFFECTIVE DECISION MAKING FOR ATTORNEYS AND CLIENTS 17 (2010) (citing various
studies).
38. Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1919, 1961 (2009).
39. SIMON, supra note 13, at 203.
40. See generally Justin Kruger & David Dunning, Unskilled and Unaware of
It: How Difficulties in Recognizing One's Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated SelfAssessments, 1 PSYCHOL. 30, 44 (2009) (noting that in many domains of life, success
depends on knowledge).
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 17, at 429–30 (discussing various irrelevant
factors that may influence a juror’s decision).
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has found that people who are unskilled in “intellectual domains”
like the law suffer from dual burdens: first they reach incorrect
conclusions and make poor choices, and second, they are unaware of
their own lack of skill in the domain.43
Moreover, most of the empirical research shows that while jurors
perform competently in many cases, when problems do arise, it is
usually a problem with the form or manner in which information is
presented to jurors.44 Because jurors must understand what the law
is before they can process it thoughtfully and apply it to the facts
they see in a trial, we can improve juror performance by improving
the ways we present the law to jurors.45 Common sense tells us that
jurors would make better decisions if given better training about the
law, and studies from educational and social psychology confirm that
this knowledge acquisition should be a major component of the jury’s
task.46 As Professor Joel Lieberman notes, rewriting instructions is
only part of the solution.47 To make additional improvements, we
should also consider recent advancements in social, cognitive, and
educational psychology, especially those approaches that allow
jurors to study and learn the law they will apply in a trial.48
Finally, more extensive juror education is not at odds with the
idea of a representative jury because the dual goals of a
representative jury—that of a “jury of peers” composed of a
“reasonable cross-section” of the community49—are both concepts

43. Kruger & Dunning, supra note 40, at 44.
44. JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS 7 (G. Thomas Munsterman et al. eds., 1997); see,
e.g., Joe S. Cecil et al., Citizen Comprehension of Difficult Issues: Lessons from Civil
Jury Trials, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 727 (1991).
45. Larry Heuer & Steven D. Penrod, Instructing Jurors: A Field Experiment
with Written and Preliminary Instructions, 13 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 409, 409 (1989)
(finding that pre-instructions help jurors follow legal guidelines in decisionmaking
and increase juror satisfaction); JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS, supra note 44, at 7; see
Haney & Lynch, supra note 36, at 427; see also Elwork et al., supra note 24, at 163
(finding that pre-instructions gave jurors a greater opportunity to focus their
attention on relevant evidence and remember it).
46. See generally Honorable B. Michael Dann, “Learning Lessons” and
“Speaking Rights”: Creating Educated and Democratic Juries, 68 IND. L.J. 1229,
1244 (1993) (“[T]he emphasis in the classroom is plainly upon learning. So it is, or, as
we have seen, should be, in the courtroom for jurors . . . . The aim of the teacher is to
impart knowledge and understanding; likewise with trial lawyers and judges.”); see
also discussion infra Part III.B.
47. Lieberman, supra note 27, at 149.
48. Id.
49. See Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) (“The American tradition
of trial by jury, considered in connection with either criminal or civil proceedings,
necessarily contemplates an impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the
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defined by how we compose juries, and not how we prepare those
sitting juries to best evaluate the evidence they see in a trial.50 The
jury of peers is intended to give defendants a fair trial by including
in the jury a representative number of people who share his
“cultural,
linguistic,
ethnic,
or,
possibly,
socioeconomic
circumstances.”51 In contrast, the reasonable cross-section
requirement ensures that members of the jury are drawn from all
segments of the community in which the trial occurs.52
Of course, the representative jury is based on the premise that
the ordinary citizen is capable of sorting out the details of most
lawsuits. Furthermore, some research suggests that representative
juries composed of people with different backgrounds and
experiences promote accurate fact-finding because such a group is
likely to hold diverse perspectives on the evidence, engage in more
thorough debate, and more closely evaluate the facts.53 As Vidmar
and Hans note, “The idea of a representative jury is a compelling
one. A jury of people with a wide range of backgrounds, life
experiences, and world knowledge will promote accurate factfinding . . . .”54 But we do not neutralize the benefits of this range of
perspectives by informing those perspectives with the proper legal

community.”).
50. The representative jury is a fundamental part of the American legal system
stemming from the Magna Carta, which required that “charges against barons
should be heard by other barons, their ‘peers,’ rather than the king.” VIDMAR &
HANS, supra note 20, at 66. And while women and minorities were historically
excluded from jury service, and service was limited to landowners until the second
half of the twentieth century, our legal system eventually moved to one of a jury of
peers drawn from a cross-section of the community. See id. at 66, 74; JAMES OLDHAM,
TRIAL BY JURY: THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT AND ANGLO-AMERICAN SPECIAL JURIES
176 (2006).
51. OLDHAM, supra note 50, at 176.
52. This second requirement argues against juries with special skills or special
qualifications, although there are examples of such “special juries” composed of citizens
with relevant specialized knowledge that will help them to more efficiently make
decisions about cases. VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 20, at 68. The earliest known
special jury convened in 1351, when a jury composed of cooks and fishmongers decided
the case of a defendant charged with selling bad food. Another special jury was the
“jury of matrons,” all-woman juries assembled in cases in which a convicted woman
awaiting execution “pleaded her belly,” or claimed to be pregnant. The jury of
matrons decided the truth of the claim and determined whether the execution should
be stayed until the child was born. Id. For an excellent discussion of the historical
development and current status of the special jury, see OLDHAM, supra note 50, at
176.
53. VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 20, at 74.
54. Id.
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rules and standards. And while it may be true that too much
expertise might actually hinder decisionmaking,55 this Article does
not argue that we should increase jurors’ expertise to that of the
lawyers or judges in the case, a solution that is neither practical nor
consistent with the ideals of a representative jury. Instead, we
should give jurors a basic legal education of the concepts they will be
expected to apply to the facts beyond that which they receive from
typical jury instructions.
Unlike judges and lawyers, who will have well-developed
knowledge about the legal concepts in a trial, jurors will often have
little legal knowledge and limited exposure to legal concepts, most of
which is gained through television and movies.56 The judges and
lawyers are legal “experts” who have an understanding of the law
that is complex, organized, and accessible, resulting in more
thoughtful judgment and better decisionmaking.57 In contrast, lay

55. KISER, supra note 37, at 22 (noting that when lawyers achieve a certain
level of expertise, they actually become worse at evaluating cases because they
become so rooted in their own ideas about what the law is and should be). Indeed,
Kiser notes that attorneys, like other highly successful people, “deflect criticism,
rarely change their opinions, [and] resist feedback . . . [they] lack self-awareness and
resist behavioral changes required to improve their problem-solving skills.” Id. at
285.
56. Often referred to as the “CSI Effect,” much has been made in the law and
media of the enormous impact fictional accounts of the legal system have on the
average citizen’s understanding of the law and the courtroom. See, e.g., Conny L.
McNeely, Perceptions of the Criminal Justice System: Television Imagery and Public
Knowledge in the United States, 3 J. CRIM. JUST. & POP. CULT. 1 (1995); Victoria S.
Salzmann & Philip T. Dunwoody, Prime-Time Lies: Do Portrayals of Lawyers
Influence How People Think About the Legal Profession?, 58 SMU L. REV. 411 (2005)
(noting that “movies change perceptions of the legal process, and that process then
conforms to our expectations”); Jeffrey Toobin, The CSI Effect: The Truth About
Forensic Science, THE NEW YORKER (May 7, 2007), http://www.newyorker.com/reporti
ng/2007/05/07/070507fa_fact_toobin (discussing the unrealistic expectations that
people may develop as a result of exposure to television).
57. SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 173–74 (1984).
Experts have better developed and more mature “schemas” for legal concepts, which
are more complex and more organized than the immature schemas of novices. Id. In
one study examining how schemas differ between novices and experts, researchers
compared the approaches of first-year law students (novices) and civil lawyers
(experts) to two tasks, a card-sorting task and a concept-elaboration task. See Fleurie
Nievelstein et al., Expertise-Related Differences in Conceptual and Ontological
Knowledge in the Legal Domain, 20 EUR. J. COGN. PSYCHOL. 1043, 1047 (2008). The
card-sorting task asked participants to sort cards into groups based on different legal
concepts and was intended to provide insight into “differences in the organisation of
conceptual knowledge of individuals at different levels of expertise.” Id. The conceptelaboration task asked participants to name everything they knew about a particular
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jurors are “novices” who lack mental frameworks for the law and
often have incomplete and sometimes incorrect legal knowledge.58
Knowledge becomes more structured and more accessible with
increasing expertise.59 Those with greater knowledge and expertise
are therefore better able to moderate inconsistencies and to make
more focused judgments and decisions.60 As Fiske and Taylor note,
“[a]ll other things being equal, greater complexity moderates
judgment. The more variety one has encountered, the more complex
the issues, the less clear-cut it all seems, and the less extreme one’s
judgment.”61
Although the egalitarian ideal of a jury composed of a crosssection of the community at first seems to argue against juries with
special training or skills, there are examples of these kinds of
“special juries” composed of ordinary citizens with relevant
specialized knowledge.62 The earliest known special jury was formed
in 1351, when a jury of cooks and fishmongers decided the case of a
defendant charged with selling bad food.63 Another well-known form
of the special jury was the “jury of matrons,” all-woman juries
assembled in cases in which a convicted woman awaiting execution
“pleaded her belly,” or claimed to be pregnant.64 The jury of matrons
decided the truth of the claim and whether the execution should be
stayed until the child was born.65 Furthermore, using experts to

topic in a short period of time (two to three minutes) and was intended to provide
insight into the participants’ depth of knowledge about the legal concepts and any
associations they made with other concepts. Id. The experts interpreted the two
tasks more efficiently and effectively than the novices who lacked mental
frameworks for the law. Id. For example, in the card-sorting task, the experts used
more central concepts when clustering concepts, while novices ordered their concepts
more randomly. Id. at 1055. In the concept-elaboration task, experts used more legal
definitions in their explanations of a particular concept, including examples from
cases, while novices used more everyday examples. Id. at 1056.
58. Nievelstein et al., supra note 57, at 1046.
59. Id. at 1058.
60. Id.
61. FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 57, at 173–74.
62. VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 20, at 68.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. (noting that, while the use of special juries was fairly common in
England in the 1700s, their use declined and was abolished in 1949). While half of
American states have at some point had some form of special jury statute, today only
Delaware has a specific statute allowing for special juries in complex cases. Id. at 69.
Some question the constitutionality of employing special juries in complex civil
ligation. See, e.g., Morris S. Arnold, A Historical Inquiry into the Right to Trial by
Jury in Complex Civil Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 829 (1980); Patrick Devlin, Jury
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resolve disputes outside of the jury system has an extensive history
in the United States, including the use of legal experts as
arbitrators, administrative judges, and specialty court judges.66
Abandoning the representative jury system entirely in favor of a
system of special juries of experts is an extreme solution and one
that is unlikely to find broad support in the courts. Furthermore,
there are benefits to a representative jury that would be lost in such
a system. A compromise position, therefore, is a representative
system that attempts to better educate lay jurors to increase their
knowledge of the relevant legal concepts, but without abandoning
the many benefits those lay jurors bring to the evaluation of
evidence. Because so much cognition is motivated, we can come
closer to achieving this ideal by motivating jurors to learn and
understand the law and to think carefully about how the law will
apply to the facts they will see in a trial. By focusing on jurors’
knowledge acquisition and development, we can develop jurors’ legal
knowledge and, in turn, make their decisionmaking processes more
efficient, flexible, and legally accurate.
Although extensive training in the law is not possible given the
time constraints of a typical trial, we can draw upon insights from
studies of motivation and goal setting to motivate jurors to
efficiently learn the law that will apply to the facts in a trial. We can
do this by framing the jurors’ task with knowledge goals, and by
teaching jurors the law before they hear about the facts to help them
maintain a deliberative mindset. These things can help increase
jurors’ motives to understand and be accurate, to minimize closure
goals, and to refrain from “freezing” their information processing too
early. Once we understand how to harness the power of motivated

Trial of Complex Cases: English Practice at the Time of the Seventh Amendment, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 43, 80 (1980); Kenneth S. Klein, The Myth of How to Interpret the
Seventh Amendment Right to a Civil Jury Trial, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1005, 1007 (1992).
Even in Delaware, it has become exceedingly rare to call a special jury, as many
special jury requests are rejected due to insufficient complexity. OLDHAM, supra note
50, at 199. One Delaware court noted that special juries are “contrary to
fundamental concepts of jury trial and would substitute a method of selection which
is inconsistent with established principles of justice.” Bradley v. A. C. & S. Co., Inc.,
1989 WL 70834 (Del. Super. Ct. May 23, 1989). Of course, the “complexity exception”
also has its proponents. Judge Richard Posner has stated that he would favor a
complexity exception in certain “complex commercial cases.” Jeffrey Cole, Economics
of Law: An Interview with Judge Posner, 22 LITIG. 23, 66 (1995). He noted: “[I]t’s
unfair really to put people through the task of trying to understand a subject which
people of higher education and intellectual attainment spend a lifetime studying
with imperfect understanding.” Id. at 67.
66. OLDHAM, supra note 50, at 196 (“The notion of bringing experts into dispute
settlement processes makes good common sense and has an extensive history.”).
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cognition, we can use insights from the fields of educational
psychology and learning theory to increase efficient learning and
allow jurors to study and learn the law they will apply in a trial.
Specifically, to improve the jurors’ understanding of the law, we can
implement a variety of teaching formats to increase learning, permit
jurors to ask questions about the facts and the law, and encourage
jurors to assess their own learning and to explain the law to
themselves through the use of special verdict forms.
II. MOTIVATED COGNITION AND THE CORE SOCIAL MOTIVES THAT
INFLUENCE DECISIONMAKING
In the classic study of “motivated cognition,” study
participants—students from Dartmouth College and Princeton
University—watched film clips from a recent football game between
the two schools.67 The game was rough: a Princeton player broke his
nose, a Dartmouth player broke a leg, and the referees made several
controversial calls throughout the game.68 When study participants
watched clips of the game, researchers found that the best predictor
of their agreement or disagreement with the referees’ calls was
whether the call favored or disfavored the students’ own school.69
For example, Princeton students saw the Dartmouth players make
twice as many infractions as they saw Princeton players make and
over twice as many infractions as the Dartmouth students saw
Dartmouth players make.70
Researchers concluded that what the subjects saw was not just
one football game, but “many different games and that each version
of the events that transpired was just as ‘real’ to a particular person
as other versions were to other people.”71 In other words, the mental
state of the subjects didn’t just shape how they interpreted what they
saw on the tape, it actually shaped what they saw.72 Professor Dan
Kahan describes this type of motivated reasoning as “the
unconscious tendency of individuals to process information in a
manner that suits some end or goal extrinsic to the formation of
accurate beliefs.”73 In other words, the perceiver’s goal motivates her

67. Hastorf & Cantril, supra note 12, at 129.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 130.
71. Id. at 132.
72. Id.; see also Kahan, supra note 8, at 19.
73. Kahan, supra note 8, at 19. The seminal piece on motivated reasoning is
Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 480–81
(1990) (noting that motivation affects “reasoning through reliance on a biased set of
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cognition; it directs her mental operations and affects her
assessment of empirical evidence.74
Like the college students who saw the game the way they wanted
it to be, all people sometimes engage in biased reasoning to bring
their beliefs in line with their desires. For example, both opponents
and proponents of capital punishment think that studies that
confirm their beliefs are more effective than studies that disconfirm
their beliefs.75 In that case, people are exhibiting “confirmation
bias,” or the tendency of people to favor information that confirms
their beliefs or hypotheses.76 Some biased reasoning is driven by
stereotypes people have about social categories, though many biases
have nothing to do with gender, race, or ethnicity.77 Furthermore,
while some bias is explicit (in that people are aware of their own
biases), much of the bias that impacts decisionmaking is implicit (in

cognitive processes: strategies for accessing, constructing, and evaluating beliefs.”).
74. Kahan, supra note 8, at 19. In a more recent study, researchers recruited
two groups of potential parents, all of whom planned to have children. Anthony
Bastardi et al., Wishful Thinking: Belief, Desire, and the Motivated Evaluation of
Scientific Evidence, 22 PSYCHOL. SCI. 731, 731 (2011). While all of the parents said
they thought kids did best when they were cared for at home, some of the parents
planned to stay home with their kids and others planned to use daycare. Id. The
parents were then given descriptions of studies comparing home and daycare. Id.
The parents who planned to use daycare found the pro-daycare study much more
persuasive than the pro-homecare study and the parents who planned to stay home
with their kids found the pro-homecare study to be more persuasive. Id. at 731–32.
For each set of parents, one study supported what they wanted to be true and
therefore had a greater impact on their decisionmaking. Id. As the authors of the
study noted, “what people believe to be true and what they wish were true can be
quite different.” Id. at 732.
75. See Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization:
The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2100–01 (1979). Each argument included a
description of the design of the study and was followed by criticisms of the study
itself and rebuttals of those criticisms. Id. Furthermore, the “net effect of exposing
proponents and opponents of capital punishment to identical evidence—studies
ostensibly offering equivalent levels of support and disconfirmation—was to increase
further the gap between their views.” Id. at 2105.
76. JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & JEAN R. STERNLIGHT, PSYCHOLOGY FOR
LAWYERS: UNDERSTANDING THE HUMAN FACTORS IN NEGOTIATION, LITIGATION, AND
DECISION MAKING 15 (2012).
77. Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124,
1128–29 (2012). For example, people tend to judge the likelihood of an event based
on how readily they can remember examples of similar instances (the “availability
bias”) and they tend to make judgments based on their first reaction gut feelings (the
“affect heuristic”). ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 76, at 72–75.
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that biases are “not consciously accessible through introspection”).78
And while scholars have suggested ways to reduce bias,79 we cannot
eliminate its influence on juror decisionmaking.80 But in the same
way that human cognition is influenced by preexisting beliefs or
cognitive biases, we can also motivate juror cognition by presenting
jurors with information in a way that motivates them to understand
the law and to persist in thinking about the law and facts until they
reach a good decision.
Social science research has repeatedly demonstrated that
people’s motivations and goals have a significant influence on how
they perceive, attend to, and interpret information.81 People with
different motives or goals may arrive at very different decisions and
may draw different conclusions from the same information as those
motives or goals change.82 More specifically, motives influence how
we notice and interpret information, as well as which knowledge
structures or schemas we use to unconsciously filter the
information.83 A review of the psychology literature identifies dozens

78. Kang et al., supra note 77, at 1129.
79. Id. at 1169; see ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 76, at 77–83; Craig
A. Anderson, Inoculation and Counterexplanation: Debiasing Techniques in the
Perseverance of Social Theories, 1 SOC. COGNITION 126, 126 (1982).
80. See Justin D. Levinson & Danielle Young, Different Shades of Bias: Skin
Tone, Implicit Racial Bias and Judgments of Ambiguous Evidence, 112 W. VA. L.
REV. 307, 346–47 (2010).
81. See, e.g., SUSAN T. FISKE, SOCIAL BEINGS: CORE MOTIVES IN SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 14 (2004) (noting that scholars define “motivation” differently); Kunda,
supra note 73, at 480 (describing motivation as “any wish, desire, or preference that
concerns the outcome of a given reasoning task”); Steven L. Neuberg, The Goal of
Forming Accurate Impressions During Social Interactions: Attenuating the Impact of
Negative Expectancies, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 374, 375 (1989) (citing
various studies); see also, e.g., GORDON B. MOSKOWITZ, SOCIAL COGNITION 96 (2005)
(defining “motive” as a “process of being driven to reduce some perceived discrepancy
between the current state of the organism and some desired state of the organism”).
82. KUNDA, supra note 9, at 246. Contemporary motivation theory assumes
that people initiate and continue behavior when they believe that those behaviors
will result in their desired goals. Henk Aarts et al., On the Psychology of Drinking:
Being Thirsty and Perpetually Ready, 92 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 631, 631 (2001); Edward
L. Deci & Richard M. Ryan, The “What” and “Why” of Goal Pursuits: Human Needs
and the Self-Determination of Behavior, 11 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 227, 227 (2000).
83. Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical Realist
Perspective On The Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1, 90 (2004); Kahan, supra note 8,
at 19. Much of the research on motivated cognition is grounded in dual-process
models of social psychology, which recognize that people make decisions and
interpret information along a continuum from quick intuitive judgments to more
thoughtful reasoning. See Serena Chen et al., Motivated Heuristic and Systematic
Processing, 10 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 44 (1999) (citing various studies); see also
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of different motives, each of which have some influence on cognition
and decisionmaking, and some of which overlap or conflict.84 And
while jurors are influenced by many overlapping motives, including
motivations personal to individual jurors like political ideology and
racial bias, when they are acting in their capacity as decisionmakers
in a trial, we can broadly categorize jurors’ core social motivational
influences as the motives to understand and be accurate and the
motive for closure.
A. The Motive to Understand & The Motive to Be Accurate
Like other people, jurors have a strong desire to understand
their world; they want to know the reasons things happen and why
the law requires what it does.85 In a famous study testing this idea,
researchers had an assistant approach people who were about to use
a copy machine and ask if they could use the machine first.86 When

MOSKOWITZ, supra note 81, at 194 (describing the dual-process model coined by
Marilynn Brewer). There are a variety of dual-process models, including Marilynn
Brewer’s dual-process model, the heuristic-schematic model coined by Shelley
Chaiken, and the theory of lay epistemics developed by Arie Kruglanski. Id. The
various models use different terminology, but all of them describe people as using a
combination of default information processing including schemas and heuristics, as
well as more effortful and deliberate mental processing. For a review of the various
models. See id. at 195–219. More recently, the dual-process model is often referred to
as a “System 1/System 2” model, with System 1 involving “fast thinking” and System
2 including “slow thinking.” See Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality:
Psychology for Behavioral Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV., 1449, 1451 (2003)
(crediting Keith Stanovich and Richard West, Individual Differences in Reasoning:
Implications for the Rationality Debate?, 23 BEHAV. BRAIN SCI. 645 (2000) with
coining the original System 1/System 2 label). Motivation influences both the form of
decisionmaking that takes place (heuristic or systematic, System 1 or 2) and it
directs whichever cognition ultimately occurs. Chen et al., supra, at 443.
84. See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 83, at 91 (identifying the motive to
understand, the motive to self-affirm, the motive to simplify, and the motive to
cohere); FISKE, supra note 81, at 15 (identifying five categories of motives, including
motives to belong, understand, control, self-enhance and trust); David A. Dunning,
On the Motives Underlying Social Cognition, in EMOTION AND MOTIVATION 137, 138
(Marilynn B. Brewer & Miles Hewstone eds., 2004) (identifying “desires” for
“knowledge,” “affirmation,” and “coherence”).
85. KUNDA, supra note 9, at 141; see FISKE, supra note 81, at 88 (noting that
although the type of unambiguous understanding that people seek varies among
cultures, the basic need to understand is a core social motive that exists across
cultures).
86. Ellen Langer et al., The Mindlessness of Ostensibly Thoughtful Action: The
Role of “Placebic” Information in Interpersonal Interaction, 36 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 635, 637 (1978).
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the assistant gave no reason for wanting to go first (“Excuse me, I
have 5 pages. May I use the Xerox machine?”), 60% of subjects
allowed the assistant to use the machine.87 Conversely, when the
assistant gave a reason (“Excuse me, I have 5 pages. May I use the
Xerox machine, because I'm in a rush?”), 94% of subjects
acquiesced.88 Interestingly, even when the assistant gave a
meaningless reason (“Excuse me, I have 5 pages. May I use the
Xerox machine, because I have to make copies?”), 93% of subjects
still allowed the assistant to cut in line.89 In other words, as long as
subjects were given some reason—legitimate or not—that helped
them understand why the assistant needed to use the copy machine
first, subjects were considerably more likely to allow the intrusion.90
Closely related to jurors’ motives to understand the law and the
facts in a trial are jurors’ motives to cohere and simplify the trial
“story” they hear. When faced with conflicting explanations, jurors
will tend to choose the explanation that “hangs together best, that is,
the story that provides the most coherent explanation of all the
relevant evidence.”91 Stories that explain more facts are more
coherent, and jurors will therefore view those stories as more
persuasive.92 Similarly, when asked to explain behavior, jurors, like
other people, will prefer those explanations that are simplest or
require the fewest assumptions.93 For example, when subjects were
told that “Cheryl” was tired, had gained weight, and had an upset
stomach, they preferred the explanation that she was pregnant to
the explanation that she had mononucleosis, had stopped exercising,

87. Id. at Table 1.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. KUNDA, supra note 9, at 140; see also Pennington & Hastie, supra note 10,
at 519 (explaining how jurors create a story that “hangs together”).
92. “[A]ll other things being equal, an explanatory hypothesis that explains
more facts is more coherent and therefore viewed as a better explanation than an
explanation that explains fewer facts.” Stephen J. Read & Amy Marcus-Newhall,
Explanatory Coherence in Social Explanations: A Parallel Distributed Processing
Account, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 429, 432 (1993).
93. Id. at 437. Dan Simon’s scholarship on cognitive coherence suggests that
when jurors are asked to apply complex legal issues, they will seek to impose
coherence on the complex task in front of them. Dan Simon, A Third View of the
Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511,
517 (2004). “Coherence-based reasoning posits that the mind shuns cognitively
complex and difficult decision tasks by reconstructing them into easy ones, yielding
strong, confident conclusions.” Id. at 513. In other words, instead of attempting to
decipher confusing and complex legal issues, jurors will instead distill the complex
decision into a simpler decision about which they can feel more confident. Id. at 517.
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and had a stomach virus.94 The simple explanation of pregnancy was
a better explanation than the conjunction of multiple examples.95
Moreover, the broad explanation of pregnancy better explained all
three facts—fatigue, weight gain, upset stomach—better than any of
the narrow explanations—mononucleosis, no exercise, stomach
virus—thus making that explanation more coherent.96
Similarly, this desire to understand is closely related to jurors’
motivation to be correct in that understanding, or their motivation to
be accurate. When people are motivated to be accurate, studies show
that they pay closer attention, think more carefully, and are less
likely to rely on general heuristics in reaching a decision.97 In
another study, some subjects were told that after making a
judgment, they would have to explain their thinking to
researchers.98 Other participants were told that their judgments
would instead remain confidential, and the experimenter would not
know how they had responded.99 The participants were then given
the responses of three actual people to sixteen personality questions
and were asked to write a description of each respondent’s
personality based on those responses and to predict how each
respondent would respond to sixteen other personality questions.100
The participants who were motivated to be accurate by being
accountable formed more complex impressions of the three
respondents, relied on a greater number of attributes to describe
each person, and made more accurate predictions about how the
respondents would answer the second set of questions.101
Many studies suggest that if we increase jurors’ accuracy goals,
this will improve their judgment, lead them to engage in more
careful and elaborate thinking, and reduce bias.102 People are
motivated to be accurate when they expect to be evaluated, when
they expect to justify their judgment to other people, when they
expect their judgment to be made public, or when they believe their

94. Read & Marcus-Newhall, supra note 92, at 436–37.
95. Id. at 436.
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., Kunda, supra note 73, at 481 (suggesting that when people are
motivated to be accurate, they pay closer attention and think more carefully); see
also Harkness et al., supra note 1, at 22 (citing studies that suggest people rely less
on heuristics when involved in solving a problem).
98. Philip E. Tetlock & Jae Il Kim, Accountability & Judgment Processes in a
Personality Prediction Task, 52 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 700, 703 (1987).
99. Id. at 703.
100. Id. at 702–03.
101. Id. at 705.
102. See KUNDA, supra note 9, at 236.
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judgment will have a real impact on other’s lives.103 Furthermore,
people motivated in this way are less likely to exhibit a variety of
cognitive biases: they are less likely to be unduly influenced by early
impressions (the primacy effect),104 they are less likely to be
influenced by the race of a writer when evaluating their work
product,105 and they are less likely to anchor on irrelevant numbers
when predicting the probability of an event.106 The reduction in bias
of people with strong accuracy goals is probably due to their more
careful and more elaborate thinking, as evidenced by the fact that all
of these biases are exaggerated when people are under time
pressure.107
Jurors are motivated to understand the law and the facts in a
trial and to fit these together into a cohesive trial story. This
motivation is closely related to jurors’ motive to be accurate in that
understanding. If we can harness these motivations by holding
jurors accountable for their decisions, jurors will pay closer attention
to the information they hear in a trial and think more carefully
before reaching a decision.

103. See KUNDA, supra note 9, at 237–38 (citing various studies).
104. Arie W. Kruglanski & Tallie Freund, The Freezing & Unfreezing of LayInferences: Effects on Impressional Primacy, Ethnic Stereotyping, & Numerical
Anchoring, 19 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 448, 453–54 (1983).
105. Id. at 457.
106. Id. at 460–61.
107. KUNDA, supra note 9, at 238 (citing various studies). Accuracy goals alone
do not guarantee increased accuracy, however. For example, telling someone to be
accurate does generally not reduce bias, nor does paying someone to be accurate. See
Mark Snyder & William B. Swann, Jr., Hypothesis-Testing Processes in Social
Interaction, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1202, 1209–10 (1978) (explaining
that subjects who were offered $25 to be “as accurate as possible” were not more
likely to be accurate). Moreover, studies of people working in their field of
expertise—a situation where subjects could be expected to be as accurate as
possible—still show persistent inaccuracies in judgment. Steven L. Neuberg & Susan
T. Fiske, Motivational Influences on Impression Formation: Outcome Dependency,
Accuracy-Driven Attention, & Individuating Processes, 53 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 431, 433 (1987) (citing various studies). Moreover, accountability can make
people defensive and self-serving when they have already committed to a choice. See
generally Philip E. Tetlock et al., Social & Cognitive Strategies for Coping With
Accountability: Conformity, Complexity & Bolstering, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 632, 633 (1989).
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B. The Motive for Closure
Like other decisionmakers, jurors need closure after making a
decision; that is, they need firm answers to their questions.108
Sometimes the motive to achieve closure—to arrive at a clear
conclusion—becomes a goal in and of itself.109 Of course, like other
motivations, this motivation for closure can vary from a strong need
to achieve closure at one end of the spectrum to a strong need to
avoid closure on the opposite end.110 If jurors have a strong need for
closure, they may display cognitive impatience: they may rush to
judgment and fail to consider alternative explanations.111
Conversely, if jurors have a strong need to avoid closure, they “may
savor uncertainty,” suspend judgment, and consider competing
explanations.112
One way to conceptualize the timeline of jurors’ knowledge
acquisition is to break it into two phases: first, they generate
hypotheses about the reasons for events, and second, they test and
evaluate these hypotheses.113 Because there are a potentially infinite
number of hypotheses for any given event, the process of generating
hypotheses must stop at some point so that jurors can move to the
second step.114 When they are motivated to achieve closure, jurors
may “freeze” this hypothesis generation as soon as they have arrived
at what is a “good enough” solution.115 Conversely, accuracy goals

108. Arie W. Kruglanski & Donna M. Webster, Motivated Closing of the Mind:
“Seizing” & “Freezing,” 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 263, 264 (1996); see also Arie W.
Kruglanski, Motivations For Judging & Knowing: Implications For Causal
Attribution, in THE HANDBOOK OF MOTIVATION AND COGNITION: FOUNDATION OF
SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 337 (E. Tory Higgins & Richard M. Sorrentino eds., Vol. 2 1990)
(defining the need for closure as a desire for “an answer on a given topic, any
answer, . . . compared to confusion and ambiguity”).
109. Kruglanski & Webster, supra note 108, at 264.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. This is the lay epistemics model of dual-processing, which focuses on the
factors that determine when closure occurs, or when people have sufficient
confidence in a particular hypothesis to stop generating other hypotheses. See id. at
334–35.
114. Id. at 335.
115. Id., at 336; see also KUNDA, supra note 9, at 242 (noting that people are
motivated to obtain closure when they are operating under time pressure, when the
decisionmaking task is tedious, or when they will be able to turn to a more enjoyable
activity when the decisionmaking is complete); see also Kruglanski & Freund, supra
note 104, at 461–62 (discussing how time pressure and evaluation apprehension
affects “freezing”).
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can motivate jurors to avoid closure: if jurors know that they will be
accountable for the accuracy of their decisions, this can motivate
them to prolong the decisionmaking process and think more
carefully.116
We can use closure goals to influence the amount of time and
effort jurors spend on decisionmaking and can therefore affect the
quality of those decisions.117 In a study demonstrating this effect,
subjects watched a woman give a speech critical of student exchange
programs and then answered a series of questions.118 Some subjects
were told that the woman chose to read the speech, and others were
told that she had no choice.119 Some subjects were motivated to
obtain closure by being told that when they were done, they would
be asked to watch a series of comedy clips, and others were
motivated to avoid closure by being told that when they were done,
they would be asked to view a lecture on statistics.120 Subjects
motivated to achieve closure spent less time on the task than control
subjects, and subjects motivated to avoid closure spent more time
than controls.121 Furthermore, although subjects motivated to
achieve closure reported a higher level of confidence in their
decisions and believed the task required less thought than those
motivated to avoid closure, they actually made poorer decisions and
were more likely to incorrectly believe that the speaker’s expressed
views were her actual opinion.122 In contrast, the more careful
scrutiny triggered by the need to avoid closure helped to improve
decisionmaking.123

116. KUNDA, supra note 9, at 243 (“Therefore, the consequences of closure
avoidance can be expected to be the same as the consequences of accuracy goals—
greater accuracy and fewer biases when increased efforts yield reliance on better
reasoning strategies, but not otherwise.”).
117. Id. at 245.
118. Donna M. Webster, Motivated Augmentation and Reduction of the
Overattribution Bias, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 261, 262 (1993). Subjects
were told they were participating in a subject designed to investigate how people
form impressions of others based on limited information. Id. at 263.
119. In such circumstances, as a result of “correspondence bias,” people tend to
assume that the speaker’s real opinions are consistent with her expressed views,
even when they know the speaker had not chosen to express the views; they
“exaggerate the extent to which her attitude corresponds to her behavior.” KUNDA,
supra note 9, at 243 (discussing Webster, supra note 118, at 262).
120. Webster, supra note 118, at 262. Control participants expected to next
complete a task that was similar to the first one. Id.
121. Id. at 264.
122. Id. at 264, 269.
123. Id. at 264.
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A juror’s willingness to avoid closure and continue generating
hypotheses about a certain event can be influenced by both cognitive
capability and motivation.124 First, jurors may not be able to
generate multiple hypotheses about what happened in the case at
hand if they do not know what facts will satisfy the legal standard or
claim; in other words, they will not know what they need to know.125
We can help jurors develop the cognitive capacity to continue
generating hypotheses about the trial “story” by teaching them about
the law before the introduction of evidence.126 Second, jurors must be
motivated to engage in hypothesis generation. We can motivate
jurors to continue generating potential hypotheses by allowing them
to ask questions about both the facts and the law in the case.127
III. HOW MINDSET AND LEARNING GOALS INFLUENCE JUROR
DECISIONMAKING
Although we can identify some core social motives—like the
motive to understand and the motive for closure—that influence jury
decisionmaking, we cannot know or control for all of the motivations
that might influence individual jurors, especially when those jurors
may not be aware of their own motives. What we can attempt to
influence, however, is how carefully jurors think about and
understand the law they are expected to apply to the facts in a trial.
We can motivate jurors to understand the law and to be accurate in
that understanding, and to avoid closure before they have carefully
considered the law and the relevant facts. Specifically, we can
motivate jurors to think more carefully about the law by inducing a
deliberative mindset rather than an implemental mindset, and we
can motivate jurors to learn the law by framing their task with
knowledge goals rather than performance goals.
A. Deliberative & Implemental Mindsets
Jurors who have not yet reached a conclusion about the facts in a
trial will think differently about the law than jurors who have
already reached a decision.128 This is because people develop a

124. Kruglanski, supra note 108, at 335.
125. Id.
126. Vicki L. Smith, Impact of Pretrial Instruction
Processing and Decision Making, 76 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL.
that pre-instructed jurors were more likely to delay making
close of evidence); see discussion infra Part III.
127. See discussion infra Part III.
128. See generally Peter M. Gollwitzer & Ronald

on Jurors’ Information
220, 226 (1991) (finding
a decision until after the

F. Kinney, Effects of
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“deliberative mindset” when they are actively deciding between two
different actions or between action and inaction.129 The deliberative
mindset concept refers to the notion that, because undecided people
do not know where their decisions will ultimately take them, they
remain more open to information and more evenhanded and
accurate in their appraisal of that information.130 Research has
shown that people in a deliberative mindset are more impartial
when processing available information,131 and are less vulnerable to
self-serving biases, including the illusion of control132 and overly
positive self-perceptions.133
In contrast, if jurors have already seen the facts in a case and
have developed a “story” when they learn the law, they will be in an
“implemental mindset,” where they try to fit the law to the story
they have created.134 Unlike the deliberative mindset, which is
characterized by an evenhanded consideration of different
possibilities, the implemental mindset is characterized by
considerations of how a given decision should be implemented to the
exclusion of new information.135 If jurors are in an implemental
mindset when they learn the law, they will only be focused on
information relevant to the story they have already created136 and
will tend to ignore information that does not support that story.137 If

Deliberative and Implemental Mind-Sets on Illusion of Control, 56 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 531, 540 (1989) (discussing how a “deliberative mind-set” may shape
an individual’s judgment); Peter M. Gollwitzer, Why We Thought That Action MindSets Affect Illusions of Control, 14 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 261, 264 (2003) (discussing how
open-mindedness may influence the direction an individual’s final decision).
129. Gollwitzer & Kinney, supra note 128, at 540–41.
130. Heinz Heckhausen & Peter M. Gollwitzer, Thought Contents and Cognitive
Functioning in Motivational versus Volitional States of Mind, 11 MOTIVATION &
EMOTION 101, 118 (1987).
131. Jürgen Beckmann & Peter M. Gollwitzer, Deliberative Versus Implemental
States of Mind: The Issue of Impartiality in Predecisional and Postdecisional
Information Processing, 5 SOC. COGNITION 259, 276 (1987).
132. Gollwitzer & Kinney, supra note 128, at 540.
133. Shelley E. Taylor & Peter M. Gollwitzer, Effects of Mindset on Positive
Illusions, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 213, 224 (1995).
134. Gollwitzer & Kinney, supra note 128, at 540–41.
135. Id.
136. Beckmann & Gollwitzer, supra note 131, at 276.
137. “It is not surprising, then, that people who are in the process of
implementing an intended project do not reflect on its value in an evenhanded
manner. Such deliberation would undermine their illusions and, thus, hinder
efficient goal achievement.” Taylor & Gollwitzer, supra note 133, at 224; see
Gollwitzer, supra note 128, at 264 (noting that “planning the implementation of a
chosen goal should create a cognitive orientation (the implemental mind-set) that
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jurors have a legal context in which to consider evidence, this will
help them better understand the evidence when they hear it and
apply it to the facts in the case.138
Moreover, juror deliberation may be improved when jurors are in
a deliberative mindset when they first discuss the evidence in a
case.139 When jury deliberation begins with a vote, which puts jurors
in an implemental mindset, jury discussions tend to be more
argumentative because jurors advocate for their established
positions. Professor Simon argues that when this happens, the jury’s
evaluation of the evidence is “more disjointed, the connections
between the law and the facts are less developed, and the debate is
less rigorous and congenial.”140 For example, one study of real juries
found that jurors who took a first vote within the first ten minutes of
deliberation were more likely to hang than juries who deliberated
before the first vote.141
Furthermore, “cognitive load” is reduced when jurors are in a
deliberative mindset, allowing them to devote more cognitive
resources to learning the law.142 Cognitive load theory is concerned

facilitates the task of the preaction phase (i.e., getting started on the chosen goal). As
this requires a more focused and selective orientation to processing information,
closed-mindedness rather than open-mindedness with respect to available
information seems called for.”).
138. See generally Smith, supra note 126, at 226 (finding that pre-instructed
subjects were better able to apply the law to the facts in a case than subjects who
were not pre-instructed). Smith notes, however, that this result cannot be seen as a
pure effect of pretrial instruction because the group that only received preinstructions (and no post-instructions) did not show this improvement, but the
results do indicate that there is benefit in hearing the instructions twice. Id. Of
course, it is important that this legal context be substantively correct, otherwise
jurors might try to fit the facts they hear in a trial to their incorrect understanding of
the law.
139. SIMON, supra note 13, at 201.
140. Id. (citing REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY (1983)).
141. PAULA L. HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., ARE HUNG JURIES A PROBLEM? NAT’L
CTR. FOR STATE CTS. 65 (2002). The authors also found that jurors tend to persist in
their early opinions. “If jurors are leaning toward conviction initially, they most often
convict. A similar pattern holds for those who initially favor acquittal. However, if
jurors are quite evenly split or the jury has only a slight majority, the case is more
likely to hang.” Id. at 66.
142. See Gollwitzer, supra note 128, at 263–64 (“[D]eliberating participants
showed an increase in their short-term memory capacity, compared with both their
own earlier span and the span of planning participants.”); see also John Sweller et
al., Cognitive Load as a Factor in the Structuring of Technical Material, 119 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 176 (1990) (stating that appropriate reorganization
of material can reduce cognitive load, which will in turn facilitate problem solving).
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with how people’s cognitive resources are used during learning and
problem-solving.143 The intellectual complexity of the law jurors
must learn generates intrinsic cognitive load, while the format and
timing of jury instructions generates extraneous cognitive load.144
Both intrinsic and extraneous load contribute to the total working
memory load imposed on the learner, and if new material is
presented to jurors in a way that causes them to use too many
cognitive resources, those cognitive resources will be unavailable for
learning.145 Intrinsic load is fixed; the law jurors are expected to
learn is intellectually challenging, but we can minimize extraneous
load by teaching the jurors the law when they are in a deliberative
mindset.
Finally, the act of making a decision about the facts, which will
move jurors from the deliberative mindset to the implemental
mindset, can itself lead to enhanced motivation; this transition,
however, should not occur until after jurors understand the relevant
law.146 If appropriately timed, this implemental mindset can help
jurors persist at reaching a correct verdict on the facts. One study
found that subjects in an implemental mindset persisted longer in
solving a puzzle and in playing a computer game, and were also
better able to disengage from the goal when appropriate.147 From
this, the authors of the study concluded that the implemental
mindset allows for a flexible response where the decisionmaker is
better able to determine when she has reached a good decision.148

143. Sweller et al., supra note 142, at 176.
144. Sharon Tindall-Ford et al., When Two Sensory Modes Are Better Than One,
3 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 257, 260 (1997). The intellectual complexity
of the material determines intrinsic load, while instructional design determines
extrinsic load. Id.
145. Sweller et al., supra note 142, at 176.
146. See David A. Armor & Shelley E. Taylor, The Effects of Mindset on
Behavior: Self-Regulation in Deliberative and Implemental Frames of Mind, 29
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 86, 87 (2003) (citing various studies).
147. Veronika Brandstätter & Elisabeth Frank, Effects of Deliberative and
Implemental Mindsets on Persistence in Goal-Directed Behavior, 28 PERSONALITY
AND SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1366, 1366 (2002). The authors noted that the
implemental mindset only had an impact on goal persistence in cases of “behavioral
conflict,” and that “[n]o differences were found when the desirability and feasibility
of the task were both low or both high.” Id.
148. Id. at 1377 (“Whenever a person has decided which goal to pursue and then
commits himself or herself to the concrete aspects of implementing the goal, an
implemental mindset . . . supports efficient goal striving—either by promoting
persistence or by preventing undue persistence, depending on the contingencies of
the situation.”).
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We can improve juror decisionmaking by teaching jurors about
the law before the introduction of evidence. If we teach jurors about
the relevant law before they hear about the facts, they will be in a
deliberative mindset, which motivates jurors to consider many
different possibilities instead of trying to fit the law into the story
they have already created. Moreover, we should encourage jurors to
deliberate thoroughly before taking the first vote to improve the
quality of the deliberations. Finally, this deliberative mindset will
reduce jurors’ cognitive load and free up their cognitive resources to
focus on learning the law and applying that law to the facts they see
in the trial.
B. Knowledge & Performance Goals
Learning is an active process and, like other learners, jurors
must be motivated to engage in this process149 and actively learn the
law.150 Research focusing on learning goals distinguishes between
“knowledge goals,” or goals to advance knowledge or skill, and
“performance goals,” or goals to complete a particular task.151 If we
can motivate jurors to actively learn the law rather than to just
reach a verdict, we can increase jurors’ knowledge of the substantive
law and improve decisionmaking.
Both motivation and cognition influence juror performance; in
other words, the quality of a juror’s decisions about the facts will be

149. It is worth noting that most of the research on goal setting was developed
within industrial and organizational psychology. Edwin A. Locke & Gary P. Latham,
New Directions in Goal-Setting Theory, 15 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI.
265, 265 (2006). Most of the focus of the research has been on employee performance
in the workplace, though it has also been applied in sports and health care contexts.
As Locke & Latham, the fathers of goal-setting theory note, it can and should be
used in any context “in which an individual or group has some control over the
outcomes.” Id. at 267. Further, one could draw many analogies between an employee
and a juror; both are paid for their time, are expected to obtain particular results,
have a “supervisor,” and are expected to work with others.
150. Both cognitive psychology and learning theory posit that learning is an
active process and that learning depends on motivation. See Michael Hunter
Schwartz, Teaching Law by Design: How Learning Theory and Instructional Design
Can Inform and Reform Law Teaching, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 347, 374–75 (2001).
This belief is pervasive throughout the general public as well. In a study of
adolescents with severe learning disabilities, most tended to attribute their learning
problems to their own lack of effort. Barry H. Schneider, LD as They See It:
Perceptions of Adolescents in a Special Residential School, 17 J. LEARNING
DISABILITIES 533, 533 (1984).
151. Evelyn Ng & Carl Bereiter, Three Levels of Goal Orientation in Learning, 1
J. LEARNING SCI. 243, 244 (1991) (citing various studies).

2014]

WHAT JURORS WANT TO KNOW

779

influenced by both her understanding of the law and her motivation
to understand the law.152 Learning goals can do one of two things:
they can help motivate people to use their existing abilities to reach
a decision, or they can motivate people to acquire new knowledge
and then apply that knowledge to their decisionmaking.153 In
situations where people already have the ability and knowledge to
complete a goal, specific and difficult performance goals are more
motivating and increase performance and satisfaction.154 In contrast,
when a situation primarily requires the acquisition of new
knowledge or skills rather than just an increase in effort and
persistence, knowledge goals, which are framed to focus attention on
knowledge or skill acquisition, are more effective.155
If jurors already knew the law they needed to know to reach a
good decision in a case, a specific performance goal to reach an
accurate verdict might lead to greater effort and persistence.156 For
instance, a series of experiments with experienced logging crews
found that loggers with specific high goals (cut X number of logs
today) had higher productivity than crews who did not have such a
goal.157 In more than 400 studies on goal-setting, researchers have
shown the positive effects on performance of setting specific and
challenging performance goals.158 The performance of skilled
employees in highly complex jobs like science and engineering,159 as

152. See Ruth Kanfer & Phillip L. Ackerman, Motivation and Cognitive Abilities:
An Integrative/Aptitude-Treatment Interaction Approach to Skill Acquisition, 74 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 657, 657 (1989) (collecting studies).
153. Locke & Latham, supra note 149, at 265.
154. Id.
155. See, e.g., Gerard H. Seijts & Gary P. Latham, Learning Versus Performance
Goals: When Should Each be Used?, 19 ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE 124, 124 (2005).
156. Locke & Latham, supra note 149, at 265; Gerard H. Seijts & Gary P.
Latham, The Effect of Distal Learning, Outcome, and Proximal Goals on a
Moderately Complex Task, 22 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 291, 291 (2001) (stating
“[w]hen an individual has the ability necessary to perform a task, setting a specific,
difficult outcome goal directs attention to effort and persistence to achieve it . . . .”);
see also Seijts & Latham, supra note 155, at 125 (discussing several situations in
which companies have provided performance goals for complex tasks and the level of
performance has improved).
157. Gary P. Latham & Sydney B. Kinne, Improving Job Performance Through
Training In Goal Setting, 59 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 187, 190 (1974).
158. Locke & Latham, supra note 149, at 265.
159. Gary P. Latham et al., Importance Of Participative Goal Setting and
Anticipated Rewards on Goal Difficulty and Job Performance, 63 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 163, 163 (1978).
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well as in sports and health care settings, have shown the positive
effects of setting specific and challenging performance goals.160
However, because jurors must first learn the relevant law before
they can reach a decision about the facts in a trial, setting a specific
challenging performance goal can actually be detrimental to
performance.161 In the early stages of learning, before routines and
skills are automatic, people must focus on learning the material
necessary to perform well. Asking people to also focus on attaining a
specific performance goal requires too much cognitive demand and
distracts attention from knowledge acquisition.162 For example, if a
novice golfer focuses on obtaining a score of 95, the novice might not
have the cognitive resources needed to learn how to swing the club
and master weight transfer.163 Furthermore, giving a person a
specific challenging goal can make them so anxious to perform well
that they fail to acquire the underlying knowledge necessary to
achieve the goal.164
Jurors need both knowledge goals and performance goals to
reach a good decision, but the performance goal to reach a correct
verdict should not be set until jurors have the legal knowledge to
attain that goal.165 In a study testing this idea in a workplace
setting, participants in a business simulation were asked to make
decisions about pricing, advertising, and financing of cellular
telephones. Participants given a knowledge goal were asked to focus
on developing strategies to increase market share, while others were
given a simple performance goal to attain a total market share of
21%.166 The ultimate market share of individuals with the
knowledge goal was almost twice as high as those with a

160. Seijts & Latham, supra note 155, at 125.
161. Id. at 126.
162. Id.; see Kanfer & Ackerman, supra note 152, at 687; see also JOHN SWELLER
ET AL., COGNITIVE LOAD THEORY: EXPLORATIONS IN THE LEARNING SCIENCES,
INSTRUCTIONAL SYSTEMS AND PERFORMANCE TECHNOLOGIES 108 (Springer 2011)
(discussing cognitive load theory) (“Asking students to problem solve, particularly
those learning new concepts and procedures (novices in the domain), creates an
extraneous cognitive load that is detrimental to learning. Instead there should be a
systematic process of using worked examples in the sense that worked examples
should be programmed to include the alternation strategy . . . and consist of
extensive practice prior to solving sets of problems unaided.”).
163. Seijts & Latham, supra note 155, at 126.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 128; see also Kanfer & Ackerman, supra note 152, at 687 (noting that
“interventions designed to engage motivational processes may impede task learning
when presented prior to an understanding of what the task is about . . . [while those]
following development of declarative knowledge may facilitate performance.”).
166. Seijts & Latham, supra note 155, at 127.
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performance outcome goal.167 Moreover, individuals with the
knowledge goal “took the time necessary to acquire the knowledge to
perform the task effectively” and “were convinced they were capable
of mastering the task.”168 The authors concluded that this increase
in self-efficacy was a result of the knowledge goal and the resulting
acquisition of the knowledge necessary to perform the task well,
while the performance goal led to a “mad scramble” for solutions.169
Finally, knowledge goals will be more helpful to jurors who are
trying to construct a “story” about the evidence they will ultimately
see in a trial. The story model of juror decisionmaking suggests that
in order to make sense of all of the evidence they are asked to
evaluate, jurors construct a story of what they think happened.170
Knowledge goals will motivate jurors to try to answer questions
about the law or facts needed to understand the story.171 These
focused knowledge goals will also help jurors to conserve limited
cognitive resources by allowing them to spend time drawing
inferences relevant to their goals of understanding the story and
ignoring irrelevant information.172
The difference between knowledge and performance goals is
“first and foremost a mindset,” and much of the difference to jurors
will be in how we frame their goals as jurors.173 For a performance
goal, instructions would be framed around task performance; for
instance, in a typical trial, jurors are told they should apply the law
they are given to the facts they have heard in a trial to reach a
verdict.174 The acquisition of the knowledge to attain the goal is not
mentioned because knowledge of the law and the skill to apply it to
the facts is considered a given.175 In contrast, a knowledge goal
would frame the instructions in terms of knowledge acquisition;
jurors could be told which law they are expected to understand

167. Id.
168. Id. at 127–28.
169. Id. at 127.
170. Pennington & Hastie, supra note 10, at 519.
171. Ashwin Ram, A Theory of Questions and Question Asking, 1 J. LEARNING
SCI. 273, 282 (1991).
172. Id. at 275 (“What the system learns from the story depends on what it
needs to learn, that is, on its knowledge goals.”).
173. Seijts & Latham, supra note 155, at 128.
174. See, e.g., Vt. Gen. Jury Instructions, available at http://www.vtbar.org/User
Files/Files/WebPages/Attorney%20Resources/juryinstructions/civiljuryinstructions/ge
neraljury.htm (last visited July 18, 2013) (“It is your duty as jurors to follow the law
as I shall state it to you, and to apply that law to the facts as you find them from the
evidence presented in court.”).
175. See Seijts & Latham, supra note 155, at 128.
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before they are asked to apply it to a set of facts. The knowledge goal
“draws attention away from the end result”176 and instead moves the
focus to an understanding of the substantive law. Once the jury has
that knowledge, it can be given a performance goal to reach a verdict
using that law.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS: WHAT MOTIVATED COGNITION MEANS FOR
HOW WE SHOULD TEACH JURORS ABOUT THE LAW
Although extensive training in the law is not possible given the
time constraints of a typical trial, we can draw upon these insights
from studies of motivated cognition to motivate jurors to efficiently
learn the law and to think carefully about how the law will apply to
the facts they will see in a trial. Once we understand how to harness
the power of motivated cognition, we can use principles of
educational psychology to increase efficient learning and allow jurors
to study and learn the law they will apply in a trial. Specifically, we
can teach jurors the law using a variety of formats to increase
learning before the introduction of evidence, we can give jurors
knowledge goals and allow them to ask questions to enhance their
understanding of the law and the facts, and we can ask jurors to
explain the law to themselves through the use of special verdict
forms.
A. Teach Jurors About the Law Before the Introduction of Evidence
The timing and form of jury instructions and juror education
about the applicable law can have a profound impact on juror
comprehension of the law.177 Some courts have begun to pre-instruct
jurors about the substantive law, giving jurors an overview of the
relevant black letter law and general legal principles before the
introduction of evidence, and eight states currently require preinstruction.178 In other states, judges have discretion to determine
the timing of jury instructions.179 Psychology research tells us that

176. Id.
177. See, e.g., Elwork et al., supra note 24, at 163; Heuer & Penrod, supra note
45, at 409, 425–26.
178. For an overview of state law on juror pre-instruction on substantive law, see
State of the States Survey, supra note 22, at 36.
179. 89 C.J.S. Trial § 809 (2012). Appellate courts consistently leave decisions
about the timing of instructions to the discretion of the trial court judge. See, e.g.,
United States v. Ruppel, 666 F.2d 261, 273–74 (5th Cir. 1982); People v. Valenzuela,
142 Cal. Rptr. 655, 657 (Ct. App. 1977). Some appellate opinions encourage the use of
pre-trial instruction. See Valenzuela, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 658 (“[W]e commend the
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this type of pre-instruction can help motivate jurors to get a handle
on the applicable law before they become too bogged down in the
facts of a trial, allowing them to better understand and remember
the evidence they will hear in a trial.180
Much of the time, however, juror pre-instruction only addresses
general legal principles like burden of proof or reasonable doubt, and
does not usually include specific instruction about the elements of
the crime or claims at issue.181 Moreover, even when jurors are preinstructed, this addresses the timing rather than the form of the
instructions. The instructions still leave most of the responsibility
for teaching and learning to the jurors themselves, with little
monitoring of how well jurors actually comprehend the substantive
law or additional assistance if jurors do not understand the law
included in the instructions.182
We should go further and give jurors a comprehensive education
on all of the legal principles they will be expected to understand and
apply during a trial before they hear the facts.183 If jurors learn the
law before they hear the facts, they will be in a deliberative mindset
when they receive their education about the law, making them more
receptive to new information and more impartial when processing
evidence.184 Because jurors are typically not given instructions on
the applicable law until after the presentation of evidence, they have
already created an initial impression of the case, and the law that
they learn will tend to support that established disposition.185 They

astute judge who tries to give the jury advance notice of the law applicable to the
case . . . . However, as we see it, the purpose of pre-instructing jurors is not to avoid
the necessity of instructing at the close of argument; rather, it is to give them some
advance understanding of the applicable principles of law so that they will not
receive the evidence and arguments in a vacuum.”). Others advise against it. See,
e.g., People v. Murillo, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 21, 24 (Ct. App. 1996) (noting that the
preferable method is to give the jury instructions after the close of evidence but
before closing arguments, while acknowledging that the trial court has discretion on
this matter).
180. See Elwork et al., supra note 24, at 163 (finding that pre-instructions gave
jurors a greater opportunity to focus their attention on relevant evidence and
remember it); Heuer & Penrod, supra note 45, at 409, 425–26 (finding that preinstructions help jurors follow legal guidelines in decisionmaking and increase juror
satisfaction).
181. See State of the States Survey, supra note 22, at 36.
182. See, e.g., Elwork et al., supra note 24, at 164.
183. Of course, the trial itself sometimes shapes the legal claims the jury
ultimately decides, but we can instruct jurors on the major claims involved in the
trial and the ones they are most likely to decide.
184. See discussion supra Part III.A.
185. See Heuer & Penrod, supra note 45, at 412.
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will have already begun to analyze the facts and reach a decision
without the benefit of an education about the applicable law.186 If
instead we teach jurors the applicable law before the presentation of
evidence, they will still be in the deliberative mindset when they
learn the law, leading to more careful consideration of the law and
better decisions.
Furthermore, research in cognitive load theory suggests that
jurors should be introduced to information in a variety of ways—not
just through written or verbal instructions—in order to reduce the
load on working memory and improve comprehension.187 Some
instructional presentations impose such a heavy cognitive load
before learning begins (because they require the learner to mentally
organize and process multiple elements) that they can interfere with
the acquisition of new knowledge.188 Because learning and problemsolving impose heavy cognitive demand, the form of the presentation
itself should minimize the use of cognitive resources and allow
learners to devote available cognitive load to the acquisition of new
knowledge.189 We can reorganize learning materials to eliminate
extraneous cognitive load and improve learning and problemsolving.190 Specifically, when material is intellectually challenging—
thus imposing a high intrinsic cognitive load—learning materials
that combine dual-mode presentation techniques—e.g., auditory text
and visual diagrams—result in better learning.191
In the jury setting, we can improve juror comprehension of the
law by instructing jurors using dual-mode presentation techniques,
which would combine standard jury instructions with flowcharts and
animated videos. One study of these kinds of instructions showed
that jurors given a simple flowchart outlining the law of selfdefense—in conjunction with verbal instructions about the law—had
improved comprehension of the law.192 In another study, mock jurors

186. See id.
187. See Sweller et al., supra note 142, at 176; Tindall-Ford et al., supra note
144, at 257.
188. See Sweller et al., supra note 142, at 176.
189. See id.
190. Id.; Tindall-Ford et al., supra note 144, at 260.
191. Tindall-Ford et al., supra note 144, at 282.
192. Carolyn Semmler & Neil Brewer, Using a Flow-Chart to Improve
Comprehension of Jury Instructions, 9 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 262, 266 (2002).
The authors are careful to note, however, that despite increased comprehension of
the underlying law, when the study participants were asked to apply their
knowledge (from the instructions and the flow chart) to novel scenarios, most still
performed poorly, although “there was a hint of better performance in the instruction
plus refer flow-chart condition.” Id. Therefore, flow-charts should not be the only
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who were shown an animated video depicting various elements of
self-defense (in conjunction with verbal instructions about the law
and flowcharts) showed marked improvement in comprehension
across a variety of measures, including verdict accuracy, a multiplechoice test, a paraphrase measure, and a test of transfer of legal
knowledge to novel facts.193
Furthermore, the use of animated videos has been shown to
bring lay jurors’ level of comprehension of self-defense up to that of
law students who had completed an entire criminal law course.194 In
this study, the judge described the legal components of murder and
self-defense, specifically the requirement that there be a “reasonable
possibility” that the defendant acted in self-defense.195 While the
judge was describing the elements, participants saw an animation of
three balls, in separate frames, being thrown against a pane of
glass.196 “A tennis ball had ‘a chance,’ a baseball had a ‘reasonable
possibility,’ and a steel ball was ‘almost certain,’ to break the
glass.”197 Although the law students’ performance was superior to
other legally untrained subjects when both heard standard verbal
instructions, that performance difference disappeared when both
saw the animated video.198
By teaching jurors the substantive law at the beginning of their
jury service when jurors are still in a deliberative mindset, we can
motivate jurors to learn the applicable law before they are expected
to apply it to the facts in a trial. Research in goal setting suggests
that this will increase juror self-efficacy and improve
decisionmaking. Furthermore, we should introduce the law to jurors
in a variety of ways in order to reduce cognitive load and improve
comprehension.

method to increase juror comprehension and performance, but should be combined
with the other methods and approaches outlined here.
193. Neil Brewer et al., Improving Comprehension of Jury Instructions with
Audio-Visual Presentation, 18 APPLIED COGN. PSYCHOL. 765, 773 (2004).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 769. In another vignette, the judge spoke about the requirement that
the defendant believe her conduct was “necessary and reasonable.” While he spoke,
two animations appeared. “The first depicted a man pointing a knife at a woman’s
throat, she then looked around before kicking the man to the ground, apparently
believing she had no choice.” Id. The second showed the same characters, “but when
three other people approached, the man dropped his knife. The woman still kicked
him, but this time it was apparent that alternative action was possible.” Id.
198. Id. at 773. The law students failed to improve and the legally untrained
subjects’ performance matched the law students’ performance levels. Id.
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B. Allow Jurors to Ask Questions About the Law and the Facts
Allowing jurors to ask questions allows them to reason, to
understand, and to learn.199 Giving jurors knowledge goals and then
allowing them to ask questions about the law will motivate jurors to
acquire and organize new legal knowledge.200 When jurors are given
a knowledge goal—to learn the relevant substantive law—this goal
will often take the form of questions when they have insufficient
knowledge to deal with the facts in the case.201 These knowledge
goals will cause jurors to “focus on what he or she needs to know, to
formulate questions in acquiring this knowledge, and to learn by
pursuing these questions.”202 Learning occurs when the juror’s
questions are answered.203 These knowledge goals, then, focus the
learning process and direct learning.204
Some courts allow juries to ask questions of witnesses, and a few
states even require that jurors be permitted to ask questions.205
Several studies have shown that asking questions is helpful to
jurors’ understanding of the case, especially in cases where the
evidence or law is particularly complex.206 Specifically, asking
questions allows jurors to clarify complicated testimony or legal

199. Ram, supra note 171, at 273; see also Claude Sammut & Ranan B. Banerji,
Learning Concepts by Asking Questions, in 2 MACHINE LEARNING: AN ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE APPROACH 167, 168 (Ryszard S. Michalski et al. eds., 1986) (noting
that questions help students learn new material).
200. See Ram, supra note 171, at 274; see also Seijts & Latham, supra note 155,
at 125 (noting that knowledge goals facilitate learning by focusing an individual’s
attention on knowledge or skill acquisition).
201. See Ram, supra note 171, at 273.
202. Id. at 274.
203. Id. at 274–75.
204. Id. at 277.
205. For an overview of state law on juror questions, see State of the States
Survey supra note 22, at 34–35. In a survey of 11,752 trials in all 50 states and the
District of Columbia, 15.1% of state court trials allowed juror questions of witnesses,
and 10.9% of federal trials allowed the practice. Id. The Federal Rules of Evidence do
not prohibit or permit the practice. Id. at 4, 32. Rule 611(a) provides that “The court
should exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of examining witnesses
and presenting evidence so as to: (1) make those procedures effective for determining
the truth; (2) avoid wasting time; and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or
undue embarrassment.” FED. R. EVID. 611(a).
206. Dann, supra note 46, at 1253; Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror
Questions During Trial: A Window into Juror Thinking, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1927, 1963
(2006); Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation in Trials
Through Note Taking And Question Asking, 79 JUDICATURE 256, 262 (1995–96).
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issues.207 Moreover, asking questions allows jurors to engage more
actively in the presentation of testimony and to develop their
understanding of the trial “story” because “the answers to juror
questions appear to supplement and deepen juror understanding of
the evidence.”208 To the extent that jurors are like students who need
to understand the law they will need to apply in a trial, questions
allow jurors to clarify their understanding, correct confusion, and
improve comprehension.209 In national field experiments of states
that permitted and did not permit juror questions, jurors who were
allowed to ask questions rated themselves as better informed about
the law.210
Opponents of juror questions point out that it can distract jurors,
delay the trial process, and remove jurors “from their appropriate
role as neutral fact finders.”211 Some judges also express concern
that jurors might give undue weight to a judge’s decision not to
permit a juror question.212 Studies of juror questions have shown,
however, that questions do not add significant time to trials, and
that jurors tend to focus their questions on the primary legal issues
in the case.213 Furthermore, most of these potential problems are
mitigated by procedures governing the asking of questions, including
requiring judges and attorneys to screen questions before they are
presented to witnesses.214 Furthermore, one study found that jurors
rarely expressed surprise, let alone offense, when judges did not
permit witnesses to answer a question.215
Most courts that do permit juror questions, however, only allow
questions about the facts of the case rather than about the law.216
When judges do receive a question from a juror about the law, they
typically tell the juror they cannot answer the question, or they refer
the juror to the jury instructions.217 But sometimes the jury
instructions are not enough to clarify jurors’ understanding of the

207. Heuer & Penrod, supra note 206, at 262.
208. Diamond et al., supra note 206, at 1931.
209. Id. at 1931–32.
210. Heuer & Penrod, supra note 206, at 260.
211. United States v. Ajmal, 67 F.3d 12, 14 (2d Cir. 1995).
212. See Judge N. Randy Smith, Why I Do Not Let Jurors Ask Questions in
Trials, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 553, 564 (2004).
213. Diamond et al., supra note 206, at 1931.
214. Id. at 1965–67.
215. Id. at 1933.
216. See generally id. (discussing juror questions and common courtroom
practice).
217. See generally id. (discussing juror questions and common courtroom
practice).
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law.218 We should go further and allow jurors to ask questions when
they are confused about the underlying substantive law. These
questions could be answered by the judge, and like jurors’ questions
of witnesses, the judge could serve as a gatekeeper, and all potential
questions could be approved by the attorneys in the case to ensure
that the questions are not unfairly prejudicial to either side.219
Furthermore, questions can signal to the judge and the lawyers in a
case that jurors are unclear on an area of law.220 Although jurors are
the triers of fact, asking questions about the law will help jurors to
better understand the relevant law in order to make better decisions
about the facts.221
Finally, by letting jurors ask questions and giving them reasons
for why the law should apply the way it does, we can motivate jurors
to correctly apply the instructions they receive. As Professor Duane
Wegener notes in Flexible Corrections, “it is not enough to simply tell
jurors what the law requires; the judge’s instructions must sell them
on the goal of adhering to the constraints of the law.”222 Research in
other contexts has shown that giving jurors this kind of explanation
does make them more likely to follow the judge’s instructions.223 For
instance, one study found that when jurors were told that the
compensatory damages they awarded would be trebled, they gave
significantly lower awards,224 suggesting that jurors tended to lower
their awards to avoid a windfall for plaintiffs.225 When the same
jurors were told to ignore the trebling rule, the awards did not
increase.226 However, when the jurors were told the rationale behind
the trebling rule, the awards increased significantly.227
Because jurors must acquire new knowledge about the law before
they apply that law to the facts in a case, knowledge goals, which

218. See id. at 1931–32.
219. For an example of a state statute that governs juror questions, see NEV.
REV. STAT. § 16.140 (2013) (noting that [juror questions] “shall be in the presence of
or after notice to the parties or counsel.”).
220. Diamond et. al., supra note 206, at 1947.
221. Id. at 1949–50.
222. Duane T. Wegener et al., Flexible Corrections of Juror Judgments:
Implications for Jury Instructions, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 629, 647 (2000);
accord Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Determining Punitive Damages: Empirical Insights
and Implications for Reform, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 103, 196 (2002).
223. See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond & Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding The
Jury To Verdict Consequences: Damages, Experts, And The Civil Jury, 26 L & SOC’Y
REV. 513, 532, 534 (1992).
224. Id. at 534.
225. Id. at 513, 532, 534.
226. Id. at 534.
227. Id. at 533–34.
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could be framed to focus jurors’ attention on learning the law, will be
more effective than simply admonishing jurors to reach an accurate
verdict.228 Furthermore, giving jurors knowledge goals and then
allowing them to ask questions about the law may motivate jurors to
avoid closure and to continue considering other possibilities and
generating multiple hypotheses about events.229 If jurors are
motivated to avoid closure in this way, this could lead to reliance on
better reasoning strategies, fewer biases, and greater accuracy, thus
improving juror decisionmaking.230
C. Instruct Jurors to Complete Special Verdict Forms
Jurors can be taught to know what they do not know, to assess
how correct their decisions are, to efficiently use their own cognitive
resources, and to monitor their own learning process.231 This process
is known as metacognition, or “thinking about one’s own
thinking,”232 and refers to the understanding and awareness that
allows people to take control of their own learning.233 Because it is
the juror who must ultimately store and retrieve the law, it is crucial
that they be active participants in learning that law.234 If jurors are
better able to think about their own thinking and their own
understanding of the relevant law, they will make better decisions
about the facts in a trial. Special verdict forms, which require jurors
to explicitly consider how the facts in a case support each element of
each claim and to explain the connection between law and facts,235
can help make jurors accountable for their decisions and therefore
increase accuracy motives.236 In turn, this accountability can
motivate jurors to be more complex in their thinking and more
accurate in their judgment.237

228. See discussion supra Part III.B; see generally Seijts & Latham, supra note
155, at 125 (noting that knowledge goals facilitate learning by focusing an
individual’s attention on knowledge or skill acquisition).
229. See discussion supra Part II.B.
230. KUNDA, supra note 9, at 243; see discussion supra Part II.B.
231. Schwartz, supra note 150, at 376.
232. Id.
233. THOMAS A. ANGELO & K. PATRICIA CROSS, CLASSROOM ASSESSMENT
TECHNIQUES, A HANDBOOK FOR COLLEGE TEACHERS 373 (2d ed. 1993); see Schwartz,
supra note 150, at 376 (defining metacognition as “the set of learning and study
skills which encourage learners to be introspective, conscious, and vigilant about
their own learning”).
234. Schwartz, supra note 150, at 376.
235. FED. R. CIV. P. 49.
236. See discussion supra Part II.A.
237. See discussion supra Part II.A.
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One way to increase efficient learning is to ask people to make
effective
self-explanations
because
explaining
enhances
understanding.238 “A self-explanation is a mental dialog that
learners have when studying . . . [which] leads to an understanding
that builds a complete and accurate mental model.”239 When people
learn new information, they learn it more efficiently if they are
asked to explain that new information to themselves.240 A good selfexplanation requires deep processing of the material and can
therefore improve performance.241 Furthermore, the positive effects
of self-explanations have been seen in a variety of contexts and
across age ranges.242 In a study testing the benefits of selfexplaining, eighth-grade students read a passage about the human
circulatory system.243 Half of the students then read the passage a
second time while the other half were instead asked to self-explain
what they had just read.244 All of the students took a test of the
circulatory system before and after reading the passage.245 Students
who self-explained learned more, and the students who generated to
most self-explanations learned the most.246 As the authors noted,

238. RUTH CLARK ET AL., EFFICIENCY IN LEARNING: EVIDENCE-BASED
GUIDELINES TO MANAGE COGNITIVE LOAD 226 (2006); see also Michelene T. H. Chi et
al., Eliciting Self-Explanations Improves Understanding, 18 COGN. SCI. 439, 439
(1994) (establishing the self-explanation effect as a way to increase efficient learning
and understanding).
239. CLARK ET AL., supra note 238, at 226–27.
240. Chi et al., supra note 238, at 441.
241. CLARK ET AL., supra note 238, at 228; SWELLER ET AL., supra note 162, at
188.
242. CLARK ET AL., supra note 238, at 228.
243. Chi et al., supra note 238, at 450–51. Specifically, the students were asked
to read 101 separate sentences about the circulatory system and given the following
instructions:
We would like you to read each sentence out loud and then explain what it
means to you. That is, what new information does each line provide for you,
how does it relate to what you've already read, does it give you a new
insight into your understanding of how the circulatory system works, or
does it raise a question in your mind. Tell us whatever is going through
your mind—even if it seems unimportant. You may need to go back and reread parts of the text to really understand all the material. Also, some
people find it helpful, when reading difficult material, to draw a picture or
take notes. Please feel free to do what is best for you . . . .
Id.
244.
245.
246.

Id. at 451.
Id. at 450–51.
Id. at 457.
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“not only does eliciting self-explanations promote greater learning,
but the more students self-explain, the deeper their
understanding.”247
Jurors can be asked to self-explain through the use of a special
verdict form. Judges can require jurors to return a verdict in civil
cases in three ways: a general verdict, a general verdict with
interrogatories, or a special verdict.248 General verdicts ask jurors to
declare the winning party and the relief granted; general verdicts
with interrogatories ask jurors to give a general verdict and to
answer specific factual questions; and special verdicts ask the jury to
answer a series of factual questions that are relevant to the legal
issues in the case.249 Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
describe special verdicts as requiring only “a special written finding
on each issue of fact,” they often consist of mixed questions of law
and fact.250 Because each question in a special verdict form refers to
a specific fact necessary to satisfy each element of the legal claim,
they require jurors to think about each element individually and
help jurors think about the elements within the context of the
factual case.251
Special verdict forms can improve jurors’ metacognition and
decisionmaking by highlighting the structure jurors should follow
when they deliberate about complex concepts, and the selfexplaining associated with special verdict forms can make jurors
accountable for their decisions and motivate them to be more
accurate.252 Moreover, if jurors are required to think through how
the facts in a case support each element of each claim, they will be
better able to recognize the quality of their own understanding of the
law. Furthermore, special verdict forms could help prevent the

247. Id. at 470; see also Jan Hawkins & Roy D. Pea, Tools for Bridging the
Culture of Everyday and Scientific Thinking, 24 J. FOR RES. IN SCI. TEACHING 291
(1987) (discussing innovations in science education, which encourage students to
explain as a way of learning complex science).
248. FED. R. CIV. P. 49; Elizabeth C. Wiggins & Steven J. Breckler, Special
Verdicts as Guides to Jury Decision Making, 14 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 2 (1990).
249. FED. R. CIV. P. 49; Wiggins & Breckler, supra note 248, at 1–2 (finding
partial support that special verdicts improved juror comprehension of instructions).
250. FED. R. CIV. P. 49; Wiggins & Breckler, supra note 248, at 3. The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure give judges a great deal of discretion to ask jurors to
complete special verdict forms that use “any other method that the court considers
appropriate.” FED. R. CIV. P. 49(a)(1)(C). Therefore, while some special verdict forms
might ask the juror to determine the speed of a vehicle (question of fact), the form
might instead ask how fast the defendant was driving and whether it was negligent
to drive that speed down a residential street (mixed question of law and fact). Id.
251. Lieberman, supra note 27, at 144.
252. Id. at 145.
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coherence effect, whereby jurors faced with complex legal concepts
and ambiguous facts reduce complex decisions to more manageable
decisions they can feel confident about.253 Special verdict forms can
improve jury decisionmaking in both civil and criminal cases
because the forms can help jurors isolate individual elements of
claims and crimes, offsetting the potential coherence effect.254 In
cases where there is substantial evidence for one element but only
minimal or insufficient evidence for another, the coherence effect
suggests that fact finders will find the defendant liable or guilty
despite the lack of evidence of a particular element.255 “In such
cases, correctly administered special verdicts could serve to expose
that evidentiary deficiency.”256
In studies examining the effect of special verdict forms on juror
comprehension, mock jurors reported feeling more informed about
the law, more confident that their verdict was correct, and more
confident that their verdict reflected a proper understanding of the
law.257 Jurors found special verdict forms to be especially helpful in
cases involving large quantities of information.258 Other studies have
found that although special verdict forms improved understanding of
the law, they did not affect the jurors’ ultimate decisions, and that
jurors made decisions based on their impression of the parties and
not on an “orderly consideration of legal issues.”259 Of course, jurors
were not told about the law until after the end of evidence, at which
point they “appeared to have already formed strong impressions of
the parties,” and special verdict forms did little to ameliorate this
effect.260 If jurors are instead taught the law before the presentation
of evidence, this effect can be minimized.261

253. Simon, supra note 93, at 517.
254. Id. at n.283.
255. Id.
256. Id. As Professor Simon notes, special verdict forms would have some
collateral effects, and there are concerns that special verdict forms impose restraints
on jury nullification by restricting jurors’ rights to ignore instructions and decide
cases independently. Id.
257. Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Trial Complexity, 18 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 29,
50 (1994).
258. Id.
259. Wiggins & Breckler, supra note 248, at 32.
260. Id.
261. Of course, it is also important that special verdict forms, like all material
given to jurors, incorporate psycholinguistic principles to ensure they are clear and
understandable to jurors. See generally Brewer et al., supra note 193, at 766 (“Some
studies have found that instructions rewritten according to psycholinguistic
principles improved jurors’ understanding of the law . . . .”).
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If jurors are taught to think about their own understanding of
the law, they will make better decisions about the facts. We can
encourage this juror metacognition by requiring jurors to complete
special verdict forms that ask jurors to think about each element of
each claim individually and to consider how they fit within the
context of the factual case. This requirement will help increase
jurors’ accountability for their decisions, increase their motive to be
accurate, and lead to better decisionmaking.
CONCLUSION
Because juries are typically composed of lay people with no
special legal training or background, jurors must first be educated
about the applicable substantive law and procedural rules before
they can reach a decision on the facts. The entirety of most jurors’
education on the law is contained in jury instructions, which tell
jurors about the applicable law and give them a mechanism to
interpret the facts they have seen in a trial. While the instructions
are meant to teach jurors about the relevant law, they are not
typically written with the jurors’ education in mind, nor do they
generally offer much guidance to jurors for applying the law to the
facts of the case in order to reach a decision. And while knowledge
acquisition should be a major component of the jury’s task, jury
research has consistently shown that jurors only understand about
half of the law they are expected to apply to the facts in a trial.262
Extensive training in the law is not possible given the time
constraints of a typical trial, but we can draw upon insights from
studies of motivated cognition to motivate jurors to efficiently learn
the law and to think carefully about how the law will apply to the
facts they will see in a trial. All people are intrinsically motivated to
make sense of their surroundings, and jurors are similarly motivated
to understand the law they will need to apply to the facts in a trial in
order to reach an accurate verdict. These core social motives affect
the cognition and decisionmaking of all jurors, and we can use these
motives to increase juror comprehension of the law and improve
decisionmaking. Like other frameworks and biases that affect how
people perceive and interpret information, we cannot eliminate this
type of motivated cognition, but we can use it to motivate jurors to
understand the law, to be accurate in that understanding, and to
persist in thinking about the law until they reach a good decision.

262.

See, e.g., Elkwork et al., supra note 24, at 219.

